Lebanese Interests: Democracy

Some preliminary statements:
- There are no such things as objectivity, neutrality, or impartiality.
- An analysis is never apolitical; every analysis carries within it a political standpoint that favors one force over the other.
- Critical analysis is usually set to favor the dominated/resistant standpoint.
- Every argument entails a counter-argument, not the potentiality of a counter argument.


The Lebanese presidential elections are on the doorstep. Consecutive failures of diverse international, Arab, and internal initiatives to get over the political deadlock in the country, have left the French initiative with little hope of success. Nonetheless all the attention is on the outcome of the coming days. However, there is a greater and more dangerous dimension to the crisis in this fragile country: a social, political, and sectarian polarization that opposes two irreconcilable discourses. Great controversy arises every time one writes about Lebanon. One reason is the extreme polarization, a factor that perturbs dialogue and puts in place two mutually eliminating opinions that diverge on a deep structural level.

One cannot look at Lebanon or at the Middle East in general while disregarding the impact of colonial power and the dynamics of power relations. The initial disagreement between the two prevalent discourses in Lebanon is their look at the role of colonial power. This division is extended to the whole dynamics of Arab politics and inter-Arab conflicts. On the one hand, there is an opinion that grants the dominant Other (the ‘democratic West’) a benevolent role on the path towards freedom. In this discourse freedom is synonymous to liberalism. Here one must differentiate between two notions of liberalism: economical liberalism, and social liberalism. The one can exist without the other, and often do (an example of economical liberalism that is far from being a social liberalism is Saudi Arabia, and most of the Gulf States). In Lebanon the proponents of this discourse are divided between those who adopt liberalism in its double sense and those who are great opponents of this model and rather opt for economical liberalism linked to social conservatism. On the other hand, there exists the opposite opinion that attributes to the Other (the ‘colonial West’) a malevolent role that blocks the path towards freedom. In this discourse freedom is synonymous to liberation. Liberation is a democratic rather than liberal aim. Nonetheless the two can coexist.

The strategies differ greatly between the two camps. The first one, represented by the 14 of March forces and Fouad Sanioura’s government, is set in the greater discourse of what the American administration recently termed “Arab moderation”. In other words these are the proponents of the subjugation to the West as both an economical and political stabilizing choice. The argument of this group is that ‘we’ are too weak to oppose the powerful Other therefore must acknowledge this position by adhering to its interests and politics. Democratic choice in this case becomes synonymous to the adherence to the Other’s values rather than to the popular majority’s choice (here the example of the Palestinian elections and the victory of Hamas are easily compared to the Lebanese case). The second group, represented by the opposition, namely Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, is placed within the category termed “terrorist” by the same American administration, and represents the forces that oppose the Other’s domination. The interests of the Other are seen as the main destabilizing factor because they are in contradiction with the interests of the popular majority. In other words, the subjugation to the other is seen as a long term destabilizing factor and the cause and effect schema is inverted. Economical and political stability can only be achieved through the neutralization of the Other’s interests – thus through conflict with the Other. The self is not seen as weak, rather it is empowered and represented as capable of liberation and of defeating the Other (in here the Hezbollah discourse notably during and after the summer of 2006 war provides a good example).

However, the notion of liberation is not so much an idealistic aim as much as it is a strategy of resistance that seeks first and foremost to become dominant. Here history provides examples of liberation movements who sought the support of great dominant powers in order to oppose another dominant power. The Soviet Union’s relations with liberation movements all around the world is the most salient example. This dynamics of power reflects the role of Iran in the current Lebanese situation, whereas a common enemy provides the ground for a support that is different in its economical and political groundings from the traditional unilateral colonial model. In other words, the discourse of the opposition considers that Iran’s role in the Lebanese crisis cannot be seen as the mirror image of that of the United States of America or of Europe. Nonetheless, it is in no way a moral action, nor is it disinterested; rather, Iran’s interests are seen as momentarily intersecting with those of the opposition forces inasmuch as it refuses the same Other’s interests. In other words, the opposition discourse pretends that whereas the West’s interests are structurally opposed to those of the majority of the Lebanese population, Iran’s interests are momentarily convergent to those of this majority. However, these converging interests are not structurally convergent, on the contrary, in the normal course of things these interests will be, like those of the West, structurally divergent.

This opinion can be inverted, and one can substitute Iran for the West and reciprocally. In fact, this is exactly what the government’s discourse does. It pretends that the interests of the West and those of the people converge momentarily, while those of Syria (the ‘colonial Other’ in this case) and Iran are structurally divergent. This, perhaps, is equally true and is certainly the basic reflection of the radical polarization of the two opinions. However, there exists one solution to define the interests of the Lebanese population, and that is to let it speak. In other words, democracy pretends to represent the interests of the people by giving the people the right to decide where their interests lie. The only viable solution for the Lebanese deadlock is to let the majority speak about its interests and choose, directly, which discourse represents its interests.