How to become a martyr: a guidebook

It is perhaps a prologue for the next Middle Eastern war, or more specifically the next Lebanese war. The new “martyr” is the copyright holder of the “quantity and quality” theory. He is also the heir, not anymore, to the throne of the Phalanges party in Lebanon, a premature politician and a law graduate who was curiously the minister of industry.

Tires are burning in front of the Phalange headquarters, people are angry, and emotions are running high. It is a recipe for a nice little war.

It is easy to simplify, and easier to oversimplify. The assassins were already identified, moments after the news of the assassination; it is the Syrians for some, Bashar el Assad personally for others. Of course when asked about proof all would reply with the same rhetorical answer: “isn’t it obvious?”

Of course the answer to this rhetoric question is simply No, it is not obvious. In fact it is far from being obvious. If the act of declaring the obviousness of something is enough proof, then why does one need trials and investigations? Many assassinations, in fact most of them, have obvious features. Most of political assassinations are thought over in order to conceal the perpetrator; at least the one who plans the assassination has to take 5 minutes to think about how to conceal his/her identity. The obviousness of a crime does not make it solved. And when this same obviousness is far from being so, then the one who sees the obviousness of it knows more than those who do not, and thus has the duty and responsibility of presenting the FACTS that make it so.

The sequence is however more complex. If one wants to know, or at least seeks to know a certain truth, one must analyze the context and the conditions as well as the motives.

If it is, as common legal sequences consider, the profiting party that is firstly suspected, then one must start here. If a rich old guy gets killed, his children are certainly suspects. The motive is always central to discovering a crime.

The supporters of the “obvious” analysis are clear on that point, the motives are:

1. To stop the international court for the assassination of Hariri
2. To kill enough ministers in order for the cabinet to collapse
3. To kill all those who oppose Syria
4. To help Iran in defending its Nuclear program

Refuting these claims can be done briefly:

1. The international court is already agreed upon (not in words, but in action). The fact that the legal details are being discussed does not mean that it is possible for anyone – even if will exists – to stop the proceedings of this court. The only thing anyone can do at this moment is to discuss the details of the court, but the court itself is going to be formed.
2. This solution for collapsing the cabinet – a declared goal of the opposition – was actually supposed to be done, more convincingly, in tomorrow’s demonstrations. In fact this assassination has actually halted, at least delayed, the calls for the cabinet to resign. In fact the assassination has the exact opposite effect.
3. This is far from being a realistic strategy of any system, even the Syrian one.
4. This is simply ridiculous.

Tomorrow or the day after was supposed to be the day of demonstrations for the opposition. The assassination, to say the least, has changed these plans. The assassination in a way or another has succeeded in doing what 14 azar diplomacy did not succeed in doing, namely prevent the demonstrations. It also made it clear that any popular movement will now transform into riots. In fact this assassination has given a reason for the government to take over the streets itself. I will not be surprised if taking over the streets will have for title the resignation of the President of the Republic. If this happens it is not easy to imagine that it was indeed the Syrians that actually killed the young Gemayel.

Lebanon has become an important factor in both American and French foreign affairs. It is not easy to imagine that they will easily let go their “democratic success”. That is they will not easily allow the democratic expression of the opposition from undoing what the Cedar revolution has established. In short it is not in the interest of neither the opposition neither Syria (for once) to have a civil disturbance in Lebanon. Once such events break in Lebanon it would be easy to transform the UN troops stationed in the south of the country into an international force that governs the whole of the country and with a mission statement to disarm the armed factions, namely the Hezbollah.

It is also of great importance to look at other intriguing factors which should not be so easily undermined or looked over:

Some days ago Samir Jaajaa announced imminent assassinations of ministers in the cabinet; his information must have come from somewhere and must have had at least a foundation. When one has “information” about possible assassinations it is not a small bird that comes from the window and tells one that a minister is going to be assassinated and Jaajaa automatically believes this bird because it is a trustworthy bird. Things are more complicated than that. The one who told him so must have had information and this information is vital. It was also the American spokesmen who backed these claims. They had intelligence reports that assassinations will be help against the cabinet. These reports must have content and therefore must have proof. Of course this proof was never supplied.

Last month there was another intriguing incident, one that did not acquire the attention it should have acquired. It was the case of the gun-silencers caught heading to the American Embassy in Lebanon. The same weapons – at least in form – were used for today’s assassination. Three gunmen armed with rifles with silencers killed Gemayel. The American Embassy had declared these silencers were used for air-guns (air guns do not need silencers as far as I know). The case was dropped in silence.

The assassination was held in the crowded region of Sin-el-Fil a Christian suburb of Beirut, it is highly populated by supporters of the Lebanese Forces, the same party Jaajaa leads. The gunmen disappeared. They must have gone somewhere.

If one is to go back in history, or to the very near history, assassinations of the sort were a trademark of the Lebanese Forces that Jaajaa had taken over in the mid-80s. The case of Dani Cham’oun and Tony Franjiyeh are a small sample.

It is not to say that it was Samir Jaajaa who killed Gemayel son, but to point out to some other factors apart from the anti-Syrian opinions of Gemayel.

Now the roles are turned. The government calls for demonstrations, and the opposition is at home. In tactical terms the assassination seems like a successful move by those who support the government whoever these might be.